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2014 Fed Challenge Script: Current State of the Economy
Abstract

Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here today. Though the recession began in 2007 and
officially ended in 2009, recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to close the
output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and inflation has stabilized below the Federal
Reserve percent target. We are not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in the economy during the past year,
we do not believe that economy is on a self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy
actions taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been insufficient. We propose a
substantial strengthening of the our forward guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal
funds rate until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with the dual mandate.
[excerpt]
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Economics 267 & 367 Fall 2014
Current State of The Economy

Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here
today. Though the recession began in 2007 and officially ended in 2009,
recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to
close the output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and
inflation has stabilized below the Federal Reserve percent target. We are
not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in
the economy during the past year, we do not believe that economy is on a
self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy actions
taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been
insufficient. We propose a substantial strengthening of the our forward
guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal funds rate
until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with
the dual mandate.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the output gap to be
around 3.6% in 2014 and projects a return to full employment by 2017.
However, this forecast reflects the fact that the CBO has revised downward
its estimate of potential GDP every year for the last 7 years. The economy is
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approaching full employment not because of strong growth in actual GDP
but because of repeated downward revisions in potential GDP. [VoxEU
slide] Larry Summers estimates that half of the decline in potential output
is due to a drop in the capital stock due to lower investment since 2008, a
phenomenon that could be reversed with sufficient economic expansion.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.8 percent in October, at the top
end of our current range of estimates for the natural rate of 5.2 percent
to 5.8 percent. But, the low unemployment rate disguises a large amount
of slack in labor markets. For instance, the labor-force participation rate
has fallen from 65.9percent to 62.8 percent since the beginning of the
recession. While some is due to structural factors, research by Stephanie
Aaronson and her co-workers finds that 0.25 – 1.0 percent of the decline
is due to cyclical factors. The employment - population ratio is low, also
suggesting cyclical factors contributing to unemployment. Probably the
most convincing evidence of slack in the labor market is the failure of
wages to rise significantly: average nominal hourly earnings increased
only 2.2 percent in the year ending in October.
Inflation has been below the 2 percent target since 2012. According
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the core PCE chain-type price index
increased at a rate of only 1.4 percent for the twelve months ending in
October. There are no signs of inflationary pressure in the economy. Oil
prices have fallen in recent months due to global economic weakness and
new energy supplies. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil has
fallen to $81 per barrel at the end of October from over $100 in June.
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In addition, the dollar has appreciated significantly against other major
currencies, putting downward pressure on prices of imported goods. And
again, wage growth has been subdued. The absence of inflationary pressure
is apparent from the decrease in the spread between the yields of 5-year
nominal Treasury Securities and 5-year TIPS bonds (or the ‘breakeven
inflation rate’) which has fallen from 2 percent in June to 1.6 percent in
November. This indicates that the market expectations are currently that
inflation will fall short of the target for the next five years.
The current sustained weakness in the economy is likely to persist
for a long time. The crash in the housing market weakened household
balance sheets. Research by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi has shown
convincingly that the debt overhang has contributed to weak consumption
growth. Richard Koo calls this a ‘balance sheet recession’ and notes that
recovery will be slow because of household deleveraging, which reduces
consumption spending. Koo and other economists such as Larry Summers
and Olivier Blanchard warn of the possibility of insufficient aggregate
demand for as long as the next 10-15 years.
A self-sustaining recovery cannot occur until households have
worked off the debt overhang. Data on household debt show that there is
a long way to go. Total credit market debt of households is 105 percent of
disposal income, still higher than any year before 2002. Consistent with
Koo’s theory, household savings remains high, especially relative to prerecession trends. The personal saving rate has been above 5 percent since
the recession, compared to 2-4 percent from 2005-07. Recovery in the
housing market is widely seen as essential for improvement in household
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finances. But after signs of strength in 2013 the housing market has cooled
off in 2014. Acording to Case-Shiller home price index, house prices fell
1.3 percent from April to August of this year. Real residential investment
has fallen by one percent in the year ending in the third quarter of 2014.
Recent positive developments have caused speculation that we
will start raising interest rates in mid-2015. This is premature. Though
GDP growth was estimated to be 3.5% in 2014 Q3, the widening of the
trade deficit for September suggests that this figure will likely be revised
downward.The results of the midterm elections suggest that fiscal policy
could become more of a drag on economic performance in the near
future due to increased pressure to cut spending. The low employment
growth domestically, coupled with slow projected growth for Europe and
certain emerging economies, suggest that making monetary policy less
accommodative would be premature and costly to a still-shaky American
economy.

Our Policy Recommendation: Clarify Forward Guidance

With the phasing out of large-scale asset purchases last month,
we are currently relying on forward guidance to reduce long-term interest
rates. But the type of forward guidance that we have employed since 2009
has been less effective than it could be. From August 2011 to October
2012 we specified that we would keep the federal funds rate near zero until
a particular date, a policy known as calendar-based forward guidance. In
December 2012 the we switched to a data-based forward guidance strategy
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by promising not to raise the federal funds rate until the unemployment rate
fell to 6.5%. But in March 2012, as the unemployment rate was dropping
more quickly than anticipated, we changed our criteria to a mix of labor
market conditions. Michael Woodford has argued that the our statements
to this point have not had the desired effect because the we have not been
clear enough about the criteria that we will use to judge whether to raise
the federal funds rate. As a result the we have not been as successful in
managing long-term interest rates as it could be.
We propose that the Federal Reserve clarify the criteria that will
trigger the beginning of interest rate increases. Under our proposal, which
is similar to recommendations made by Michael Woodford and others, the
FOMC will pledge to maintain the federal funds rate target at its current
range as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic path. This
path would represent the path it would have followed if monetary policy
had not been constrained policy by the zero lower bound since 2008.
Specifically, as indicated by our proposed statement, we project a trend of
4% annual growth in nominal GDP from the fourth quarter of 2007. We
commit to holding off on interest rate increases until we are close to the
target. When we are close to the target we will begin to increase interest
rates at a measured pace so that policy is normalized at the trend level of
GDP.
Our proposal improves on the current forward guidance strategy
in the following ways.
●

The nominal GDP criterion clarifies the ultimate goals of the
FOMC. It replaces the vague references in the current statement
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to “a wide range of information, including measures of labor
market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation
expectations, and readings on financial developments.” We
thereby send a clearer signal to the public about how much more
growth must occur before the we begin to raise interest rates.
●

We estimate that under this proposal we will not begin raising
interest rates for at least two years. This is a more expansionary
signal than the current policy, under which expectations are for
rate increases beginning next summer, which will lower longterm interest rates.

●

The nominal GDP criterion promises a combination of real
economic expansion and higher inflation. The prospect of
economic expansion will increase consumer and business
confidence and generate higher spending. The prospect of higher
inflation will generate more spending by lowering real interest
rates. Higher inflation also reduces the real value of household
debt, which will assist in recovery of balance sheets. This is an
improvement over the current policy, which risks signaling to the
public that the Fed views the current state of the real economy
and inflation under two percent as satisfactory outcomes.

We have prepared some forecasts of what our policy implies
for the economy. The scenarios shown on the graph assume that the real
output gap is currently 4 percent and the growth rate of potential GDP is
2 percent. Real GDP has grown at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in each of
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the last two years. At this pace, it will take over 13 years for the economy
to reach full employment.
●

Nominal GDP is currently 8.7% below the nominal GDP trend
line that we hope to achieve. We assume that trend nominal GDP
grows at 4% per year.

●

Scenario 1 assumes that the combination of lower long-term
interest rates and increased expectations of growth and inflation
causes nominal GDP to reach its target in two years. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 8.4% per year.
Inflation in excess of current levels is unlikely unless there is a
strong pickup in real GDP growth, so it is reasonable to assume
that nominal growth is roughly evenly divided between real
growth and inflation. This would imply 4.2% real growth and
4.2% inflation per year, which would eliminate the output gap in
the year that the nominal GDP target is achieved.

●

Scenario 2, which we believe is more likely, assumes that the
nominal GDP trend line is reached in three years. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 6.9 percent per year.
If growth is evenly divided between real growth and inflation, this
implies 3.5 percent real growth and 3.5% inflation per year, and
again the output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.

●

Scenario 3 assumes a four year path to recovery. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average pace of 6.2 percent per year.
Real GDP grows at 3.1 percent and inflation is 3.1 percent, and the
output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
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Our policy risks higher inflation if the output gap turns out to be
smaller than we believe it is. For example, under Scenario 2, nominal GDP
grows at a rate of 6.9 percent per year. If the output gap is two percent rather
than four percent, we could conceivably see the output gap eliminated
in two years and real growth falling to two percent in year three, which
would imply a 4.9 percent rate of inflation in that year. Clearly inflation
at that level is not acceptable in the long run, but a temporary burst of
inflation is a small price to pay for full recovery from the recession. In
the final analysis, even in the high inflation scenario the average inflation
rate beginning in 2007 will be near the our target of 2 percent; the higher
period of inflation we promise for the most part merely compensates for
the below-target inflation of the last several years.
To conclude, we find that the economy is in worse shape than it
appears to be judging from the unemployment rate and the CBO’s estimate
of the output gap. The Federal Reserve has fallen short of its mandate of
full employment and price stability since the recession began in 2007. Our
proposal offers a chance to restore full employment and price stability. It
does so by clarifying the our forward guidance statement: specifically, by
committing us in terms that are as explicit as possible to a period of growth
and reflation. It is a bold step, but one that is absolutely necessary in light
of current economic conditions. Thank you for listening, and we welcome
your questions.
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